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MARK S. ROSENTRAUB"
INTRODUCTION
The globalization of professional sports, such as Major League Baseball
(MLB), raises anew the issue of how international associations, nation-states,
and national sports leagues should or could share responsibilities for the
management of a sport. Underpinning this issue is how sports governance
systems represent the interests of club owners, players, fans, other affected
businesses, and the public interest of different societies. Developing
governance systems that include the varied interests of these diverse
stakeholders has become more complex now that the leagues in separate
nations are themselves developing linkages with international organizations
created to govern specific sports. Even baseball leagues in North America and
Europe are developing international marketing programs that create
transnational relationships.
At the same time, international sports organizations exist for virtually
every sport, and the governance of the world of sports has become
exceedingly complex in the global era. For example, the Fd~ration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)' is the international governing
body for world soccer. FIFA is responsible for regulating the elite domestic
soccer leagues in England, Italy, Spain, and Germany, each of which markets
team products internationally and in countries where they do not have teams.
Unlike the baseball and hockey leagues in North America, the English
Premiership and the first-division national leagues of Italy, Spain, and
Germany do not have teams in other countries.2 Each of these elite soccer
* Professor and Associate Dean,School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,
Indianapolis.
1. For more information on FIFA, see http://www.fifa.com (last modified Nov. 14, 2000).
2. This may change if two of Scotland's soccer teams join the English Premiership League in the
not-too-distant future.
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leagues, however, televises games in many different countries in Europe, the
Middle East, and North America. The marketing of teams and games in other
nations may affect the viability of domestic leagues. The presence of leagues
in other nations raises the competition level for fans, players, and media.
The situation is even more complex and intriguing for North American
professional sports leagues. While numerous countries have baseball,
basketball, and hockey, the champions of North American leagues are widely
regarded as the best teams. In addition, MLB, the National Basketball
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL) are the most
visible and leading organizers and promoters of these sports.3 Yet, MLB,
NBA, and NHL are sports associations that bridge only two countries in North
America. In an organizational chart of world sports, these associations would
rank below international baseball, basketball, and hockey associations. FIFA
organizes international competitions to crown the best national team (World
Cup) and the best overall team (Club Championships), but which
organization-MLB or the international baseball association-should have
control over a true world championship? To establish such a championship,
whose schedules should conform to the others, whose rules should be
followed, and which league or organization should have final control over
resources or other organizational elements?
These questions are but a subset of the larger question that I answer in this
Article. As sports leagues continue to seek global markets for players and
fans, what is the best form of governance to protect the interests of all
stakeholders in the operation and organization of the sports? Global sports are
now regulated by a "crazy quilt" map of governance associations: the
International Olympic Committee, numerous world sports associations,
transnational and national sport leagues, and various State actors each trying
to control or affect some aspects of sports. Does this fragmented and
overlapping system of governance represent the interests of all stakeholders?
How could or should the governance of sports be organized to represent the
interests of club owners, players, fans, and national, regional and local
3. The National Football League (NFL) does operate a European League, but the game of American
football is not played in other countries to the same extent or at the same level as basketball, hockey, or
baseball. In that sense, basketball, hockey, and baseball are truly international games with independent
leagues in other nations. American football has a limited following in other countries, but no indigenous
leagues outside of the NFL and its European subsidiary exist.
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governments?
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the appropriateness of a global
governance system for world sports and baseball by analyzing the role of
sports in societies. In Part II, I identify sports stakeholders and their interests.
In Part Ill, I present and discusses a theoretical approach for governing a
global sport. In Part IV, I examine different models of governance and the
strengths and weaknesses of these models in connection with MLB. In the
Conclusion, I offer some final thoughts about the future of global governance
for baseball and other global sports.
I. GOVERNING SPORTS: WHY IS THIS AN ISSUE?
The question of how sports should- be governed might appear misplaced
or irrelevant to some. After all, sports are entertainment and a diversion from
the more tedious elements of life. Does this form of entertainment deserve
special consideration? Should we analyze the level of control different groups
have over the management, business, and economics of sports? Are these
questions that are best left to markets, fans, and sports organizers to answer?
Sports are, however, much more than a diversion. Sports warrant a higher
level of discussion because of the important role they play in many societies.
Sports are but a very small fraction of the global economy or even the
economy of any major city, but they have been and remain fundamental
components of life in many societies. Large-scale sporting events in the
Western world began as celebrations, such as the Olympics in ancient Greece.
The Romans established professional sports through training academies for
gladiators, the sale and trading of combatants to and between different
families, and awarding substantial benefits-including freedom from slavery
-to the most successful gladiators.4 Sporting events were part of the festivals
of some of North and Central American peoples long-before the arrival of the
Europeans. In addition, Islamic and Asian societies also have a history of
sports as celebrations that are integral to their cultures.' Within certain
societies, sports have been used as entertainment to occupy the attention of the
4. JOHN WILSON, PLAYING BY THE RULES: SPORT, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE (1994).
5. See generally, JAMES A. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA (1976).
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working class.6 Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that sports are far more
than a diversion to keep the masses entertained and docile.7
Do these examples of sports in different societies establish sports as an
institution deserving of global governance, or can the regulation of sports be
left to individuals and markets? We first must agree that sports are a defining
element of society and not merely a pleasurable diversion. If sports are not a
critical element of society, then there may be little reason to suggest that other
constituencies should be involved in any governance plan or that the interests
of individuals should in any way be curtailed to satisfy the interests of other
constituencies. If sports are a critical element of society, then to create such
a governance system requires a balance between private control and the right
to pursue economic self-interest.
The influence of sports affects religious and civic celebrations, social
organizations, politics, and language. Specifically, religion and sports have
been tied together through ancient festivals8 and the benedictions or prayers
that are part of some athletic events in the modem era. The Hippodrome that
was built adjacent to the Aya Sofya (Hagia Sofia) and the Blue Mosque in
Istanbul is another example of sports and religion intermixing. Civic holiday
celebrations in the United States, of course, involve sporting events. Special
athletic events mark Independence Day (baseball), Memorial Day '(auto
racing), Labor Day (tennis), New Year's Day (football), and the celebration
of the life of important leaders (Martin Luther King, George Washington, and
Abraham Lincoln). Major sporting events such as the Super Bowl, the
Indianapolis 500, and others frequently unify patriotic themes (e.g., the
singing of the national anthem, the use of military aircraft) with the staging of
the event.
Sports have also been used to underscore the supremacy of different
political systems.9 The last few decades have seen different Olympic Games
used to make various political statements, and emerging nations continue to
seek athletic events as tools of modernization. The bid by the Chinese to host
6. ANTHONY KING, THE END OF THE TERRACES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENGLISH FOOTBALL IN
THE 1990S (1998).
7. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annete Lavers trans., 1972).
8. Chichdn Itz, located in Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula, was built to host an annual event that
involved games and sacrifices to a deity.
9. See HARRY EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT (1973).
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the 2000 Olympics affirmed this point, as does the quest by South Africa to
be the site of the first World Cup championship to be held in Africa. Nazi
Germany, East Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States each used
their hosting of the Olympic games to illustrate the benefits of each respective
country.
Sports are also used to organize social life. In the United States, weekend
high school, college, and professional football games, as well as European
soccer matches, define the social calendars of millions of families. In fact,
sports are so integral to social life that decades ago when the NFL did not
televise sold-out homes games, the U.S. Congress first threatened, then
passed, legislation to ensure that sold-out games would be telecast in local
team markets.'0 Although the provisions of that legislation have expired, the
NFL continues to follow the law's guidelines rather than risk further
congressional review.
Although sports can be shown to be a critical part of society, does this
justify collective control over professional sports? After all, there is
governance of myriad domestic sporting activities in every society and
numerous levels of competition, including youth, collegiate, amateur, and
professional. Are global sports sufficiently different to warrant global
governance? The answer to this question can be found in the dominance of
professional athletics as the apex of the sports stakeholder pyramid in all
societies." While there is great interest in amateur and collegiate sports
(especially in the United States), the most popular events are those involving
professional teams. The most watched world sporting events, the World Cup
and the Super Bowl, involve professional athletes and teams. The prominence
of professional sports elevates these teams to a special position and raises
questions about the most appropriate governance structures.
If one accepts that sports are important and even a critical or defining
element for a society, the questions raised are: how does a society organize its
system of sports, and how do nations participate or interact with international
elements of different athletic systems? Recent events underscore the
10. The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (1961).
11. See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN
METROPOLIS (1997); BARRIE HOULIHAN, SPORT, POLICY, AND POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(1997).
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importance of these questions. For example, the role of bribery and corruption
in the awarding of the privilege to host Olympic games by the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) has led to embarrassment and the convening of
hearings and investigations by national and subnational governments in the
United States and Australia. 2 These hearings highlighted the extraordinary
economic and political power of the IOC, which is but one organization that
controls the destinies of global sports in the modem era.
The most striking example of the transnational power of a sports
organization is MLB. The economic and cultural impact of MLB on Latin
American countries, such as the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, is
extensive. While there are Dominican Republic and Venezuelan professional
baseball leagues, MLB dominates baseball life in these countries.
Underprivileged Latin American boys and their families often see MLB as the
way to escape poverty. As a result, the reach of MLB into these countries
extends to children and affects childhood education and the operation of youth
baseball leagues. MLB dominance also is evident in how MLB regulates
aspects of the Latin American professional league operations. 3
Professional hockey is another example of the power of the
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that control sports. The Canadian
national pastime has become a victim of international economics. The
governing body of hockey, the NHL, and member teams have issued demands
for subsidies from the Canadian government to support Canadian teams.
Canada has been threatened with the loss of some teams to larger markets in
the United States if these demands are not met. At the same time, the NHL
has not agreed to a revenue sharing program to protect the interests of smaller
market teams, including several of the Canadian teams. 4
Sports that have a global reach are controlled largely by NGOs that span
12. See e.g., The Olympic Site Selection Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Oversite and
Investigations of the House Comm. On Commerce, 106th Cong. (Oct. 14, 1999) available at
http://www.house.gov/commerce/sublist.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2000).
13. These issues are explored more thoroughly in Angel Vargas, The Globalization of Baseball: A
Latin American Perspective, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 21 (2000); Arturo J. Marcano & David P.
Fidler, The Globalization of Baseball: Major League Baseball and the Mistreatment of Latin American
Baseball Talent, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (1999); ALAN M. KLEIN, SUGARBALL: THEAMERICAN
GAME, THE DOMINICAN DREAM (1991).
14. For more on the difficulties facing Canadian sports teams in the global era, see Samuel R. Hill,
Baseball in Canada, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2000).
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subnational and national boundaries. The power of these organizations to
affect tax systems, economic development, the lives of thousands of amateur
and professional athletes, and billions of fans is just beginning to be
understood.' 5 As the political strength and economic strength of these
organizations expand, societies are learning that teams such as the New York
Yankees, the St. Louis Rams, the Montreal Canadiens, Manchester United,
AC Milan, and Real Madrid are not as important as the organizations that
govern them. MLB, the 1OC, FIFA, the NFL, the NHL, and the NBA are the
new multinational enterprises of the twenty-first century. These organizations
are reshaping individual societies; how these organizations affect and handle
the interests of various constituencies is a critical public policy matter.
If. THE STAKEHOLDERS IN GLOBAL SPORTS
A. Direct and Indirect Stakeholders
Stakeholders in global sports can be divided into two groups: direct and
indirect. Direct stakeholders are immediately involved with the operation of
a global sports system. Five sets of direct stakeholders exist: team owners,
players, fans who attend games, fans who enjoy the broadcast of the games,
and those stakeholders that wish to use sports to achieve political or social
objectives. The interests of each of these stakeholder are complex and can
vary considerably within and between groups of stakeholders.
Indirect stakeholders are not necessarily immediately involved with the
operation of a global sports system, though they still benefit from it. For
example, the media are indirect stakeholders because they earn immense
profits from sports through the broadcast of or writing about games, events,
strategies, and sports personalities. Local economic actors, such as real estate
developers, lawyers, investors, financiers, unions, and politicians, are also
indirect stakeholders. These groups benefit from the construction of team
playing facilities and the subsequent changes in real estate values, the costs
of arranging financing programs and packages, the temporary increase in the
number of construction jobs, and the opportunities to celebrate the opening of
new facilities. These groups will each seek or support a particular form of a
15. See KING, supra note 6.
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governance system that they can influence to achieve their goals and increase
their benefits. These groups also adopt strategies to influence and benefit
from the existing governance structures.
B. The Fans
To identify these stakeholders and their interests, it is best to start at the
base of a sports stakeholder pyramid (see Figure 1). At the base of this
pyramid are the fans because spectators change sports from recreation to an
event from which revenue can be generated. In the absence of fans, players
engage in sports for personal development, the pleasure of competition or
recreation, or for exercise. Instead of earning income, the players actually
Figure 1: Sports Stakeholder Pyramid
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accept costs to play the game. These costs include field or court fees and
equipment expenses. Once people desire to watch games, fees can be
collected to offset the cost of production. If interest in watching games is
sufficient, players might get paid to play. As interest in watching games
increases, then players could be paid a sufficient salary to avoid other forms
of work. The ability to earn a full-time salary from a sport provides players
with additional time to enhance their skills and abilities and provides even
greater value to the fans.
What are the interests of the fans? Their interests are to have access to the
greatest number of competitive games involving the best players. The
uncertainty of the outcome of the competition generates excitement.
Uncertainty is maximized when teams or athletes of relatively equal levels of
talent compete against each other. Fans, however, want to pay the lowest
possible price to attend games. A "fair price" ensures that athletes will have
the time to refine their skills rather than engage in other forms of labor. A fair
price would also be driven through the establishment of teams and leagues
(the supply side of sports) that equal the demand.
C. The Players
The players form the second tier of the sports stakeholder pyramid (see
Figure 1). Players generally seek to balance their interests in earning the
highest possible salary with the opportunity to secure a championship. In
other words, players seek to maximize their salaries, but they will sometimes
forego some income for the sake of playing for a championship team. The
ultimate joy of competition is winning. This result could occur, for example,
if a team needed one additional player with specific talent to win a
championship, and to afford this player, others on the team had to settle for
lower salaries.
D. The Team Owners
At the third tier in the sports stakeholder pyramid are club owners (see
Figure 1). Why are these individuals needed at all if the players could
organize their own teams? First, capital may be needed to build the athletic
20001
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facilities and provide equipment. Players, preoccupied with refining their
skills, have insufficient capital, time, and managerial talent to cope with the
business logistics of professional sports. Team owners manage the business
affairs of a team, which allows players to concentrate on winning games.
Second, a player may not be concerned with a team's preservation after he can
no longer perform. Owners, on the other hand, have a long-term economic
interest in a team's viability and work to ensure its continuity.
Team owners, like players, are profit maximizers who, nevertheless, may
be willing to sacrifice some profit to win a championship. For the most part,
however, owners want to minimize costs, pay players as little as they can, and
charge fans the highest ticket fees possible. Owners are also interested in
maximizing revenues from all sources of income, including the sale of
souvenirs, advertising, and concessions. Owners are also interested in
sovereignty over a particular market area. In other words, owners do not want
other teams from the same sport in their area competing for fans. The
formation of leagues helps achieve this end.
Some owners purchase sports franchises to indulge their competitiveness
and win championships. These owners may or may not be prepared to lose
money to reach their goal. Profits are secondary to championships. In
addition, these owners typically have other sources of income or business
interests that generate their wealth, which permits them to concentrate on
championships, even if maximum profits cannot be earned. These individuals
may not require the same level of control over every aspect of the game and
may be willing to accept conjoint forms of control of their sport. A third type
of owner purchases a sports team out of commitment to a particular
community. Like the philanthropist that donates money for a symphony, art
museum, or ballet, a team owner can endow a team so that it remains a vital
part of a community. These three groups of owners will have different needs
to control elements of the sports business. Profit maximizers will seek the
greatest possible control, whereas philanthropists will be most comfortable
with conjoint systems. This typology of owners illustrates that within any
group there may be diverging interests.
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E. Sports Leagues
Leagues form the fourth tier in the sports stakeholder pyramid (see Figure
1). These associations of owners are formed for three basic reasons. First,
leagues exist to regularize competition along agreed rules. Second, leagues
exist to ensure that teams will have other teams to play. Sports are unlike any
other business in that, to be successful, a team or athlete requires the existence
of other teams and athletes. While most other businesses can survive as the
only one in their industry, a team requires another team to play games, and for
a league to be truly successful there must be several teams to ensure variety.
Sports leagues provide this framework.
Third, the existence of a league also permits the establishment of market
areas where each owner can be assured that no other team will be permitted
to play. In this way, leagues establish monopoly areas. To protect this
monopoly position, all team owners agree that their teams will only play
games against teams in their league. This arrangement deters independent
investors from establishing teams because they would have to find other teams
to play. What are the stakeholder interests of leagues? The interests of
leagues are to ensure that each team maximizes profitability, and that there is
an adequate supply of playing talent and fans. Extending league influence
into other markets is also a priority because this can enhance profits. League
expansion can involve marketing efforts in other countries. If there are several
leagues, however, each will want to enter the market of another, and an
international organization may be needed to regulate the action among leagues
and across boundaries.
F. International Sports Organizations
International sports organizations comprise the apex of the sports
stakeholder pyramid (see Figure 1). Within this tier there are divisions. For
example, FIFA is a powerful governing body exercising leadership and some
level of political power and control over the member nation leagues. The
international basketball, baseball, and hockey associations, however, have less
power and prestige relative to the North American sports leagues. Although
the NBA has agreed to participate in a basketball world championship, no
2000]
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such "world cup" exists for hockey or baseball.
At the other end of the spectrum is the most powerful international sports
organization, the IOC. As the IOC has added more and more sports and
sought to include the best professional and amateur athletes in the world,
conflict exists between it and other international organizations and national
leagues. For example, while baseball is part of the Olympics, MLB has yet to
sanction the inclusion of major league players (the Major League Baseball
Players Association (MLBPA) would have to agree). Instead, MLB has begun
its own globalization of baseball by staging exhibition and regular season
games in different countries, including Japan, Mexico, Venezuela, and the
Dominican Republic. FIFA and the IOC have a tenuous relationship because
soccer is an Olympic sport, but IOC age restrictions limit participation in the
men's division. It is also not clear if all players eligible for the Olympics
would want to miss a portion of their season to play in the games.
Ill. GOVERNING SPORTS: A THEORETICAL APPROACH
How can or should a governance system be developed to vindicate the
diverse interests of all the stakeholders in a given sport? Developing a set of
options for systems to oversee the political economy of a global sport from a
theoretical perspective involves two steps. First, without reference to the
interests of any group in the sports stakeholder pyramid, alternative structures
can be established. This step identifies the broad range of available options.
Second, the implications of different governance structures must be analyzed
under the rubric of various stakeholder interests if we are to understand the
confluences and conflicts among those interests. Options should be discussed
in terms of the operational models that have been used to analyze stakeholder
concerns. Many different governance structures are already in use, and some
of these may offer important insights into what should guide the future of a
sport in the global economy.
A. A Typology of Governance Structures
There are three basic forms of governance structure that can exist to
oversee sports: a private-market system, a group-control system, and a public-
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federalist system. These three governance structures form the horizontal axis
of Figure 2, which constitutes a typology of sports governance components
(see Figure 2). The three basic forms can be combined into numerous
partnerships or sets of conjoint relationships with components retaining or
sharing certain powers. As a result, in formulating a strategy for governing a
sport, one can divide responsibilities among each of these components or
assign the same powers to more than one component to maintain "checks and
balances" over critical issues. In looking at the basic elements detailed in
Figure 2, it should be remembered that the horizontal axis is limited to discrete
governance forms for convenience of presentation, but the three elements
identified could be mixed together into overlapping or shared jurisdictions.
1. Private-Market Governance
In the least complex form of organization, the governance of a sport could
be completely vested in private individuals. This would permit owners and
athletes to pursue their interests and allow fans and society to value sports
through market transactions. This free market approach to sports would
empower owners, players, and fans to pursue their respective self-interests.
Leagues could be formed to permit championship schedules to be played
among teams, with individual owners making all decisions regarding the
number and location of franchises. Club owners would also be free to develop
international marketing relationships.
In this model, there is no group decision-making; each owner decides how
to develop players, how much to pay players, how to market their team, and
how to manage all other elements related to success and profitability. New
investors could enter markets that have existing teams, but other owners could
decide not to play games against these teams. Players could also make all
their own decisions regarding where they would play, and fans could decide
whether to attend. Under this private-sector governance model, the only role
for the public sector is to regulate the integrity of markets and monopolistic
2000]
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behavior. In essence, the public sector role would be to ensure that all
elements of a free market exist.
2. Group Governance
Group control implies voluntary organizations that govern the business
and economics of a sport. A group of owners, for example, could agree to
establish a league with a commissioner and assign this individual certain
powers. To protect their interests, the owners could also agree on a code of
behavior or operating principles. For example, the owners could agree to
establish territorial boundaries for each team, and these markets could be
designated as the exclusive domains of teams. Any owner who moved a team
into a market without the permission of all owners, or the owner most affected
by the move, would be excluded from playing in the league. The players
could also collectively bargain with the owners for better pay and benefits.
Similarly, if a league involved itself with international markets or issues, the
players might also have interests that should be represented.
Fans would be relegated to a market position, passing judgment on the
actions of the governance group by choosing to attend games. Public sector
activities would again be limited to enforcing market regulations. If the
decision of one group violates antitrust and anticartel rules, a conflict could
emerge. Assuming that the necessary conditions for group activity are met,
however, the leagues could decide to limit the number of franchises available
under this model. Such an action could influence the behavior of subnational
governments that seek teams for local markets. As a group, the players would
try to maximize their salary and retirement packages. Their interests could
align with owners' groups on limiting the number of franchises. An artificial
scarcity of teams would elevate salaries for players and team revenue. If
players were assured a percentage of revenue through contracts or free agency,
then a reduction in the number of teams could be in their best interest. The
four sports leagues in North America are examples of this form of
organization.
2000]
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3. Public-Federalist Governance
The third form of governance could involve three variations. First, the
State could exercise complete control over the marketing and managing of a
sport. Second, public-private partnerships could exist in which the public
sector supplied the franchises and the location of teams, leaving all other
responsibilities to private or group governance. Finally, under a true federalist
model, some responsibilities would lie at the national level and others at a
subnational level. Within this model, international concerns could involve the
participation of state, regional, and local governments in multiple countries.
B. Sports Governance Decisions
The vertical axis of Figure 2 lists a sample of sports governance decisions
that must be made for a sport to be played (see Figure 2). A list of actual
decisions would be, of course, much longer. Although the grid lines in Figure
2 are clearly delineated, in practice decision-making can overlap between one
or more governing groups that share responsibilities for certain elements. For
example, franchises could be supplied by a group of owners organized into a
league together with a players' union or the public sector. Responsibility for
players' rules could be shared between owners and the players' union, or
between the owners and that part of the public sector that regulates labor.
Each combination of decisions changes the ability of different governance
groups to represent their stakeholders' interests exclusively. For example, a
highly organized group of owners could minimize the sports governance role
of players and the public sector. This "Fordist" approach to sports governance
concentrates resources and power in the hands of franchise owners. A post-
Fordist approach, however, would either maximize incomes and profits by
leveling power-sharing between the owners of franchises and players, or
provide a greater sharing of profits with the players while the owners would
continue to retain control of the game's organization and operation. Under
either of these scenarios, the public sector does not make key decisions, and
fans are limited to "voting with their pocketbooks" when deciding whether to
attend or watch games.
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IV. GOVERNING THE GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL
In this section, I review the current governance structure of professional
baseball. In addition, I analyze other global professional sports governance
models that can be compared and contrasted to the options identified in Figure
2. Finally, I analyze the global economic future of professional baseball and
the governance issues that will arise.
A. Major League Baseball and the North American Leagues: Unfettered
Group Control
Today, professional baseball in North America is governed by a conjoint
relationship between private groups, but power is not equally shared. Rather,
there are domains (supply and location of franchises) reserved to the owners
and shared authority with the players' union over employment (e.g., contracts,
pay levels, free agency, revenue sharing, and arbitration). There is no
organized representation of fans, and the public sector exercises little control
over baseball. Subnational governments have only been able to pursue goals
through litigation and negotiation from rather weak positions that are related
to market size. MLB also exercises unfettered international power. Teams
conduct business in many nations, seeking out and developing talent in ways
that maximize the interests of MLB. 16 The MLBPA has no authority to deal
with the working conditions for major or minor league prospects in foreign
countries, even when the teams and MLB are involved in these nations.
MLBPA jurisdiction is limited to players signed to MLB contracts and on the
roster of a MLB team.
Governments are beginning to consider how they can represent the public
interest in the baseball governance system, but time-consuming political
processes, together with resource imbalances between MLB and those with
opposing interests, have not resulted in the evolution of conjoint authority.
The Congress has never fully readdressed the Supreme Court's decision that
MLB is exempt from U.S. antitrust laws. 7 This ruling has negated the ability
16. See generally Vargas, supra note 13; Marcano & Fidler, supra note 13.
17. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Fed.
Baseball Club of Bait. v. Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). See also, William
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of state and local governments to challenge MLB monopoly control over
baseball.
Other major North American sports teatns have governance structures
similar to the MLB governance structures. By negotiating with players'
unions, each league has formed a "group consensus" governance model.
Although owners are more powerful, sufficient authority and benefits have
been conferred to players to avoid labor strife. Of all of the North American
sports teams, MLB has the worst record of labor disputes and may be on the
brink of another confrontation. The NFL has achieved a remarkable state of
relations with players, and the NBA has seemed to have satisfied basketball
players with the recent agreements over salary and employment conditions.
The four major team sports are examples of a "Group Control" governance
model, with owners having a decisive control. Sufficient compromises with
players on compensation and employment, however, have established high
salaries for athletes and prevented work stoppages.
In these governance systems, fans have no real control over any specific
management or economic decisions. Fans can demonstrate general
dissatisfaction by not purchasing tickets or watching games. But given the
long-term importance of sports to people's lives, this form of collective
organization or response is rare, and when it does occur, it is too diffuse to
register a specific complaint or to attract a large segment of supporters. The
rare exception has been when some teams have moved from one area to
another and organized fan protests supplemented by public action that has led
to remedial action (e.g., Seattle and the Pilots/Mariners, Cleveland and the
Browns/Ravens). 8
B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and Watched 'Round the World
(With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 89-99 (2000)
(analyzing the evolution of MLB's exemption from U.S. antitrust law).
18. When teams move, there are varying levels of protest from fans and community leaders. In no
fewer than two instances, the protests resulted in new teams being awarded to the cities as part of a
negotiated end to any proposed lawsuits. Most recently, the public protests in Cleveland, when the Browns
moved to Baltimore, led the NFL to award a new franchise to Cleveland within 30 working days of the
announcement that the Browns were going to leave Cleveland. Cleveland's mayor led the protest, and
together with the support of fans and other elected officials, the various legal challenges to the move were
settled with the award of a franchise for a new Cleveland Browns team. The city of Seattle and King
County also challenged the move of the Pilots to Milwaukee (Brewers). Their legal action against MLB,
coupled with fan protests, led to the creation of the Seattle Mariners.
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Public sector involvement has largely been limited to facilitating the goals
of the groups controlling sports, not in devising systems to pursue the public's
interests. At the national level, laws permitting antimarket behavior have been
molded to fit the needs of different leagues (e.g., the 1961 Sports Broadcast
Act, approving mergers, failing to object to mergers, and needed tax
provisions).' 9 In this regard, the national government has facilitated group
control, limited competition, and protected the wealth and power of this
governance system while seeking very limited authority to participate in the
governance of sports or the economics of the four leagues.2" State and local
governments, fearing a captive environment in Which many communities
compete for an artificially controlled supply of teams, contribute to the group-
control process by providing their own set of incentives.2' Over the past
decades, state, provincial, and local governments have provided or secured tax
subsidies, profit guarantees, reduced rate loans, and land without seeking at
any level to govern the sports benefitted by such public action.
B. Alternative Models: The State and the Nonprofit Sector
There are, of course, other models used to govern different sports in the
United States and elsewhere. For example, the model of U.S. collegiate sports
involves conjoint control between the public sector and a private group.
Specifically, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) controls
numerous crucial elements of the multibillion dollar college sports industry.2"
Yet, in so far as public institutions are concerned, the government controls the
supply of franchises and the distribution of these franchises. States are free
19. Congress has passed two important pieces of legislation that the NFL requested in order to
improve its business environment. First, Congress pass the 1961 Sports Broadcast Act, which helped create
the current large-scale media contracts for all the of the sports leagues. Second, Congress passed the Sports
Merger Act in 1966 that enabled the NFL to merge with the AFL. That legislation also guided thejudicial
approval of the merger of the NBA with the ABA. These mergers, as well as the 1961 Sports Broadcast
Act, increased the market control of the leagues. See Mark S. Rosentraub, Are Public Policies Needed to
Level the Playing Field Between Cities. and Teams?, 21 J. URB. AFF. 377, 391-92 (1999).
20. See id. at 378.
21. See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums,
in SPORTS, JOBS AND TAxES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 55, 76-83 (Roger
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
22. See generally ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT
IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS (1999).
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to create as many sports programs as they wish through the establishment of
colleges and the dedication of the necessary resources to Division I, I, or III
programs. Similarly, a state can have numerous private colleges and
universities, and each of these can become Division I, II, or mII sports
competitors in the NCAA. Under the collegiate sports governance system,
one group-the NCAA---controls vital elements of the governance system.
At various levels of competition, this cartel establishes requirements to protect
the economic interests of the most profitable college programs. Yet, the
public sector has immense and important conjoint powers; if it wishes to
spend sufficient revenues, it can assist the efforts of a university to join the
NCAA elite levels. Such public efforts are, however, subject to NCAA
oversight and sanctions for activities that violate NCAA rules. This model
with its modest sharing of controls has not retarded the economic clout of the
industry, notwithstanding the reports of the fiscal losses of individual
programs.23 It is clear, however, that the ability of the public sector to create
NCAA Division I teams is far more extensive than public sector authority to
create professional sports teams.
C. Alternative Models: Public Sector, Individual Control, and NGOs in
Soccer
Although FIFA wields enormous power and control over the $300 billion
industry of world soccer,2 individual nation-states can and do control the
supply and location of franchises. For example, in Italy investors can create
new franchises to attract the best players. Although the new team will be
assigned to the lowest level or league, if it dominates its league, it will ascend
to the next highest division. In this way, a new team could move into the
premier league after a few winning seasons. The movement between leagues
is a result of relegation, because the two least successful teams in the highest
league are relegated to the lower league, and the two most successful from the
lower league ascend to the higher rank. Most important for the interests of
23. See MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS THE UNIVERSITY
2-3, Part I (1990); ZIMBALIST, supra note 22, at 149-50.
24. See J. SUGDEN AND A. TOMLINSON, FIFA AND THE CONTEST FOR WORLD FOOTBALL: WHO
CONTROLS THE PEOPLE'S GAME? 47 (1998).
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fans and society, the supply and location of franchises are not controlled by
the leagues or football clubs. In some nations, investors can pursue their
investment objectives and join the existing league structure. This has not
inhibited the financial success of international soccer. The most valued
franchise in team sports is now Manchester United, and gross revenues for
international soccer exceed that of every North American-based team sport.25
In North America, while the existing leagues control the supply and
location of teams, investors can create new leagues. While many of these
ventures have failed, some were successful and eventually merged with the
dominant league. For example, the American League merged with the
National League to form MLB in 1903, the American Football League merged
with the NFL in 1966, four teams from the American Basketball Association
merged with the NBA in 1976, and four teams from the World Hockey
Association joined the NHL in 1979. As a result, some believe that the
monopoly or cartel control of sports by the dominant leagues is not a problem.
The increasing size of the leagues, however, and the domination of the central
sovrces of revenue now calls into question the possibility of forming new
leagues. Indeed, recent competitive leagues, such as the United States
Football League, have failed and other investors have decided not to create
new leagues.26
D. Restoring Baseball Governance
Several issues are potential items for deliberations regarding the
governance of baseball in the global economy (see Figure 2). For example,
in terms of the supply and location of franchises in the United States and
Canada, control over the creation of teams has been vested in MLB. This
outcome has led to an shortage of teams in the largest markets. In addition,
several communities that want teams have been denied an MLB franchise.27
25. Jay Stuart, Swinging a London Deal, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS BUS. J., Sept. 18-24, 2000, at
47. ("BSkyB's original bid for Manchester United in August 1998 valued Man U at $810 million at the
current exchange rate of $1.42 for every pound. (It's now almost $1.2 billion on the stock market.)")
26. In 2000, Turner Broadcasting/Time Warner abandoned an effort to create a new football league,
and in 1995 discussions to create a new baseball league with teams owned by investors, players, and their
host communities did not lead to the development of a new league.
27. See G. S. Thomas, Norfolk Primed for the Pros, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J., Jan. 11 -17,
1999, at 1.
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To this end, the interests of fans and the public sector may not have been
adequately represented by the existing governance structure. Conjoint
authority between a league and the public sector to regulate the number of
teams may better vindicate the interests of several stakeholders.
Related to the topic of team shortages is the extent to which MLB
revenues should be shared to ensure competitiveness. If there is no agreement
to share revenues between teams or to expand the number of teams in larger
market areas, then those teams able to restrict access to the largest and most
profitable regions will, over time, have a greater ability to attract and retain
the best players. There have been repeated calls for more revenue sharing, but
to date no changes have been implemented.28 Such an outcome could conflict
with the goals for communities or the public sector, creating another set of
conflicts. Conjoint governance systems. empowering the public sector to
implement competitive market conditions or to ensure market balance would
be desirable.
Player development is another topic that spans international boundaries
and the interests of society, existing teams, and current and future players.
For example, should MLB teams be permitted to operate baseball camps for
potential players in Latin American countries and then be permitted to sign
these players before they graduate high school? When does participation in
such baseball camps become "work" that has to be regulated by government
authorities? What responsibilities, if any, exist for society or the public sector
to oversee the development and signing of very young players? Again, several
stakeholders have interests here, including existing players who may fear the
inclusion of younger athletes from foreign countries on teams to reduce an
owner's labor costs. Moreover, these issues raised by MLB foreign activities
demonstrate that several different constituencies are affected, and suggest a
conjoint model of decision-making might be better able to represent different
stakeholders than the current system, which emphasizes control by a single
group.
28. Mark S. Rosentraub, Revenue Sharing Must Protect all Interests, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
BUS. J., June 19-24, 2000 at 37.
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CONCLUSION
MLB as an economic institution will continue to look for opportunities to
expand global baseball markets and MLB presence in other countries. The
future of baseball will include the involvement of more foreign-born players,
and this dynamic will create incentives for MLB teams to find more talent in
developing or under-developed nations. Within the next twenty years, it is
foreseeable that additional MLB franchises will be developed in other
countries, including Asia and Latin American, and that these teams will play
against the North American champions in a baseball "World Cup." Greater
international competition between teams in the professional leagues of
different nations may also evolve, and the role ofbaseball as an Olympic sport
involving the best professional players from baseball-playing nations could
also emerge. The expanding success of professional sports for women
suggests that MLB should consider a structure similar to the one the NBA
used to develop its Women's National Basketball Association.
How can or should the various constituencies affected by this
globalization and economic expansion of baseball be represented in the
economic and business affairs of the sport? Within the next two years MLB
and the MLBPA will again confront one another on governance issues and the
compensation of athletes. Revenue sharing among large and small market
teams will also be part of this negotiation. At the first level, then, governance
issues within the sport will again be confined to the two dominant groups-
owners and players.
Lost within this calculus are the interests of other constituencies,
including fans, and other nations and societies. If these interests are to be
represented by the structure that emerges to govern the internationalized
economy of MLB, then it is appropriate for governments to insist that some
forms of conjoint control be explored. It would indeed be easiest to think
about a pure economic or market-based approach to the governance of
baseball. This would mean free entry into MLB for new investors and the
creation of more teams in the largest markets and markets that MLB has
refused to enter. The political reality of the North American experience is that
leagues formed by groups of owners are able to effectuate outcomes that
restrain free market systems; as such, there is little basis to suspect that MLB
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will adopt or be forced to adopt a market-based approach in the current
political environment. The league and the players are too powerful and
Congress too unwilling for a market structure for MLB to develop such an
approach. In addition, some nations in which MLB influence and markets will
expand are more comfortable with a larger tole for society and government
compared to a public sector approach to ensuring competitive markets.
The mere recommendation that conjoint governance systems should
represent the interests of all stakeholders does not mean these systems will
evolve without careful planning and attention to the concerns that are central
to all constituencies. One might be left to conclude that lasting change will
occur only through legal challenges to elements of the MLB governance
structure. If evidence is presented that MLB recruitment or signing of foreign
athletes violates elements of labor law in the United States and elsewhere, the
adjudicated outcomes must include conjoint governance systems. 9 If it is
accepted that the existing baseball governance structure harms consumers by
MLB control of the supply of franchises, then the settlement should include
greater formal roles for the public sector in the governance of baseball.
With this information, it is now time to ask how sports NGOs should
govern sports in developing international markets and what the appropriate
roles for all constituents is. Countries must require that the governance
structures of global NGOs, such as MLB, include governments and other
constituencies. Alternatively, countries must require that these, NGOs
represent the public's interests. North American sports leagues, including
MLB, have a weak record of achieving such objectives. Indeed, actions by the
leagues have led to higher taxes and fewer franchises, resulting in higher
prices and costs for fans.30 Economic trends such as these are magnified in a
global economy; the difficult and complex task ahead for baseball in
developing a global governance structure should not be underestimated.
Nevertheless, whatever strategy is adopted, it must represent the interests of
all stakeholders.
29. For arguments that MLB practices in Venezuela violate Venezuelan labor and other laws, see
Vargas, supra note 13, at 28-32. For arguments that MLB practices in Latin America violate international
human rights and labor laws, see Marcano & Fidler, supra note 13, at 551.
30. See Rosentraub, supra note 19, at 381-82.
